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Abstract: We propose an experimental method whose purpose is to re-
move social concerns in games. The core idea is to adapt the binary-lottery
incentive scheme, so that an individual payoff is a probability to see one’s
preferred social allocation implemented. For a large class of social prefer-
ence models, the method induces payoffs in the game that are in line with
subjects’ (social) preferences. We test the method in several popular experi-
mental games, contrasting behaviors with and without our methodology. Our
results suggest that a substantial part of the difference between predictions
based on selfishness and observed behaviors seems driven by such prefer-
ences, since our method does induce more “selfish” behaviors. But they also
indicate that a considerable share is left unexplained, perhaps giving weight
to alternative explanations or other types of social concerns.
Keywords: social preferences, experimental game theory, ultimatum
game, public goods game, trust game, prisoner’s dilemma, dictator game
JEL classification: A13, C65, C72, D63, D03.
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, experimental game theory has gathered ample ev-
idence that individuals tend to depart from what is theoretically expected
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from self-interested rational players. In numerous situations such as bargain-
ing and cooperation games, experimental results seem to be robustly at odds
with the game-theoretical benchmark. One of the most promising ways to
account for this regularity is to take into account that individuals may not be
indifferent to situations or behaviors of others. To this aim, several models of
social preferences have been proposed (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Levine, 1998; Cox, Friedman,
and Gjerstad, 2007). In these models individual preferences depend not only
on one’s payoff, but also on the others’, or some aspects of others’, behav-
iors (which could for instance signal intentions). Such models hence provide,
at least at the level of stylized facts, an account of this apparent departure
from theoretical predictions and observed behaviors. Adopting them does
not preclude the use of game-theoretic concepts; the latter do not require
that payoffs in the game correspond solely to individual pecuniary payoff,
although they are indeed typically operationalized using this additional as-
sumption.
Any apparent departure from the theoretical prediction can then be at-
tributed to either a departure from the standard game-theoretic model of
rational strategic behavior or the assumption that monetary payoffs duly
represent players’ preferences. What experimentalists working with game-
theory models would need to distinguish between the two is a mechanism to
induce “selfishness” within the game, or, to put it differently, to have pay-
offs in the game represent individual preferences, even for socially oriented
individuals. One implication of the social preference models is that, once the
payoffs are aligned with individuals’ social concerns, the generally observed
discrepancy between the theoretical benchmark and behaviors should disap-
pear, or at least be substantially reduced. In contrast, if the discrepancy
remains, it would indicate that it is due to some mechanism other than the
social preferences that the method controls for. In such a case, off-equilibrium
behavior observed in many experiments and typically associated with con-
cerns for others may need to be reinterpreted. The aim of this research is to
address this question by setting up a methodology that aligns individuals’
social preference with payoffs.
The method builds upon the binary-lottery payment scheme initially pro-
posed by Roth and Malouf (1979). Subjects are first asked to state their
preferred social allocation of money for the group of players. Then, they
interact through games in which payoffs are probabilities to see their favorite
allocation implemented rather than somebody else’s. Given that individuals
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have already taken into account their social preferences in the first stage,
maximizing one’s payoff means maximizing the chances to see one’s socially
preferred allocation finally implemented. As long as the player believes that
there is some probability that others have chosen a different allocation, play-
ing ‘selfishly’ appears dominant. This is true for simultaneous games as well
as a class of sequential games, if social preferences are based on final out-
comes or ex-ante distribution of expected payoff. The method also provides
some control for interdependent preferences and reciprocity concerns, in the
sense that once the choice of the first stage are made, most individuals have
little opportunity to reciprocate.
Using this methodology, referred to as the selfishness induction mechanism,
we had subjects play several games for which social preferences are often used
to explain behavior observed in the lab: the Dictator Game (DG), Ultimatum
Game (UG), Trust Game (TG), Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), and the Public
Goods Game (PGG). Our results indicate that subjects’ behavior was in
general closer to the theoretical benchmark, when our selfishness induction
mechanism was used: a statistically significant difference was found in the
DG, TG and PGG. The impact seemed to be less clear in the UG and absent
in the PD. Still, we find that the effect of our method, wherever present, is
still far from inducing behaviors in conformity with game theoretical bench-
mark. Several interpretations of the remaining discrepancy can be offered:
the mechanism may be imperfect and generate side effects; social preferences
are of a different type from the class covered by the method; or part of the
usually observed divergence in such games is not primary linked to social
preferences per se.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section
presents the theoretical details of the selfishness induction mechanism, the
third one spells out the experimental design, the fourth one exposes the re-
sults, the fifth discusses them, and section six concludes the paper.
2 The method and its theoretical properties
In this section, we first present the general idea and intuition behind the
method, then expose it in detail, and eventually derive its theoretical prop-
erties for simultaneous games and a restricted class of dynamic games. In
particular we discuss how it should control for outcome-based preferences,
procedural preferences, as well as interdependent preferences, and can be ex-
pected to mitigate the effect of reciprocity. The general idea of the method
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Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R, R S, T
Defect T, S P, P
Table 1: PD matrix: utilities
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 40, 40 0, 80
Defect 80, 0 20, 20
Table 2: PD matrix: monetary payoffs
is the following: n players interact in a game, with an additional player
(the “dummy player”), without any action to perform in the game, being
also present. Before that, all players, including the dummy player, choose
a social allocation within a constrained set: each allocation determines the
monetary payoff of all players. Then, the n players play a game whose pay-
offs are probabilities to see one’s chosen allocation implemented (hereafter
‘probability payoffs’). The dummy player collects the remaining probability.
Being uncertain about others’ choices and having no reason to believe that
a given player is more likely to have chosen any specific allocation than any
other individual, each player’s sole aim should be to maximize their own
probability payoff.
2.1 A simple example
To illustrate the method, consider a researcher willing to implement a
simple prisoner’s dilemma as represented in Table 1. What she wants to do is
to make sure that subjects’ utility levels associated with particular outcomes
satisfy inequalities defining the prisoner’s dilemma game: T > R > P >
S. The standard solution would be to assign what would seem appropriate
monetary payoffs, e.g. those given in Table 2.
Numerous experiments have shown that a large share of subjects tend
to cooperate in such games. This may be because they feel uncomfortable
with earning more than other players (advantageous inequity aversion), are
motivated by efficiency – so that, say, Player 1 prefers (0, 80) to (20, 20) –,
etc. In such a case the conclusion that subjects actually depart from playing
the dominant strategy (and hence end up off the Nash equilibrium) would be
incorrect. Instead, the researcher proved unable to align monetary payoffs in
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Cooperate Defect
Cooperate .40, .40, .20 .00, .80, .20
Defect .80, .00, .20 .20, .20, .60
Table 3: PD matrix: probability payoffs
the game with the ordering of the outcomes she had in mind. Let us denote
strict preference by . If Player 1’s preference structure is, for instance,
(40, 40)  (80, 0)  (20, 20)  (0, 80) and similarly for Player 2, then the
game is a coordination game and mutual cooperation is fully compatible with
rationality. To be sure, one could easily come up with other monetary payoffs
that would make cooperation dominated for this particular player, provided
her preference was observable (and obviously, it is not).
Applying our method to this simple game could proceed as follows: first,
an additional player is added (the dummy player) and subjects have to state
their preferences over social outcomes. For instance, subjects are first asked
whether they prefer, say 30 for everyone to 50 for oneself and 0 for the others.
Once their choices are made (and not revealed yet) the first two individu-
als play the game represented in Table 3, where payoffs are probabilities to
see one’s chosen allocation implemented. The third number represents the
payoff of the dummy player (in probabilities to see her chosen allocation
implemented).
Suppose a prosocial player has chosen the allocation (30, 30, 30), then as
long as she is not certain about others’ choices and has no specific information
about any other player, it is in her (prosocial) interest to maximize her game
payoff, that is, the probability that her chosen allocation is implemented.
Indeed, assuming her subjective probability that a given player has chosen
the symmetric allocation (30, 30, 30) is µ, and is equal for all other players,
the consequences of the game for Player 1 can be rephrased as in Table
4, setting u(0, 50, 0) = u(0, 0, 50) = 0 and u(30, 30, 30) = 1 without loss
of generality. As long as µ < 1, it is the dominant strategy to defect in
game represented in Table 3, because both relevant expected utility levels
are higher than corresponding values for cooperation as shown in Table 4.
Likewise, for a relatively selfish type of Player 1, preferring (50, 0, 0) over
(30, 30, 30), (0, 50, 0) or (0, 0, 50), it will trivially be optimal to maximize
own probability payoff.
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Cooperate Defect
Cooperate .40 + .60µ .00 + 1.00µ
Defect .80 + .20µ .20 + .80µ
Table 4: PD game final expected utility for Player 1
2.2 Definition of the method
More generally, suppose the interaction is a n-player game. Individuals are
divided into groups of n + 1, including one dummy player. The procedure
is then divided into two stages: First, subjects have to choose, from a pre-
defined set, a social allocation of the general form (x1, x2, ..., xn+1) with xk
being the monetary payoff of the kth player. These “Stage 1” choices, denoted
by θk, k = 1 . . . n + 1 are not revealed to other players. In Stage 2, subjects
first learn their roles—dummy or active player. The active ones interact
through the game, whose payoff matrix is composed of probabilities to see
one’s allocation chosen in Stage 1 implemented. Probability payoff of subject
i will be denoted by pii. The n+ 1
st subject cannot affect the outcome of the
game and collects the remaining probability, that is: pin+1 = 1 −
∑n
k=1 pik.
Formally, we will refer to Stage 0 as the stage where ‘nature” randomly
determines each player’s preferences on the set of available social allocations,
and to the overall incomplete information dynamic game, composed of Stage
0,1, and 2 as the “extended game”. The Stage 2 interaction, in contrast, will
be referred to as the “stage game”.
In our implementation of the mechanism, the social allocations available
to any player i in Stage 1 are profiles of length n+1: A = (a, a, a, a, ..., a) and
Bi = (0, 0, ..., b, ..., 0) with b being the i
th component. We set the following
constraints on a and b, to ensure that A is efficient (eq. 1) while Bi is
preferred from the self-interest viewpoint (eq. 2):
(n+ 1)a > b (1)
b > a > 0 (2)
This has the following implication: by any measure of fairness, at least as
found in the literature, A is deemed fairer than B. That includes inequity
aversion and maximin (A is a perfectly equal situation), efficiency and al-
truism.1 So from the viewpoint of fairness, A dominates Bi. A choice of
1We leave aside social concerns unrelated to fairness, such as spitefulness and compet-
itiveness, because, first, they tend to get limited empirical support and second, by nature
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A points at some prosocial motive, whereas Bi is picked if self-interest pre-
vails. Ideally, b should be chosen by the experimenter such that the difference
with respect to a is not completely negligible (so that a substantial minority
chooses Bi, and that the possibility to be matched with a B-player is real),
but not too tempting either (to ensure a substantial share of A-players, i.e.,
individuals choosing A in Stage 1, which, as will become apparent soon, are
the most interesting cases to study here).
2.3 Theoretical properties
Let i and %i denote strict and weak preference for a given player i. In
line with prevailing experimental evidence, we assume that for any player
i, Bi i Bj, j being another player. We can thus distinguish two types of
players, picked by “nature” in Stage 0: A-players are those who prefer A in
Stage 1 (A i Bi) whereas B-players are mostly motivated by self-interest
(Bi i A).2 Given the anonymous context of the experiment, we also set
Bk ∼i Bj for i, j, k different, denoting these equivalent allocations as B−i.
The perceived prevalence of types will affect subjects’ behaviors in Stage
2: we refer to player i’s beliefs about player j’s type a µij, that is player i
believes with probability µij that j has chosen A and with probability 1−µij
that he has chosen Bj.
We rely on the assumption of uniform prior beliefs : at the onset of Stage 2,
a given player i has the same priors for all the other players, given that they
are anonymous.3 Formally, we have µij = µik for all j 6= k. When player i is
under consideration only and there is no ambiguity, we denote this uniform
prior about others as µ.
2.3.1 Outcome-based social preferences
The outcome of the game is a lottery L(pi, θ) = (pi1, θ1; . . . ; pin+1, θn+1).
Now considering player i, the belief about the outcome of the game for i is a
they cannot be distinguished from selfishness in the games we test here, except in the
Ultimatum Game, for the second player, for whom rejecting an unfair offer could be due
to sufficiently strong competitive preferences.
2Given that choices are not revealed to other players and that there is a positive prob-
ability to see Stage 1’s decision implemented, we expect participants to choose their pre-
ferred allocation. We leave aside the rather unlikely case of individuals perfectly indifferent
between the two allocations, but that does not affect the argument.
3This also corresponds to experimental conditions where matching is made randomly,
substantiating a frequentist view of the situation: in the group of possible opponents, a
proportion µi are self-interested and the opponents are randomly picked.
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lottery Li given by, in the absence of any belief updating:
Li(pii) = (pii, θi;µ(1− pii), A; (1− µ)(1− pii), B−i) (3)
By stochastic dominance, if pii > pi
′
i then the corresponding lotteries Li and
L′i are such that: Li i L′i, since θi %i A and θi i B−i. This implies the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Outcome-based preferences in games with no belief updating)
An expected utility maximizing4 individual with outcome-based social prefer-
ences, holding symmetric prior beliefs about the others’ types, has her pref-
erence represented by the probability payoffs of the game.
Hence, the method ensures strict monotonicity with one’s probability payoffs.
For example, in a simultaneous game, if a strategy is dominant in probability
payoffs, then it is also a dominant strategy in the extended game.
While this proposition obviously covers all simultaneous games, some se-
quential games involve belief updating. If Player 2 modifies her µ21 in light of
the first player’s action, the latter, anticipating this, may send a costly signal.
Then, a separating equilibrium may arise (both players’ behavior depends on
their types), a deviation from the selfish benchmark. Nevertheless, for some
games of interest, equilibria of the extended game correspond to the equilib-
ria of the stage game provided appropriate solution concept is applied – here
we use the perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975). In particular, the selfishness
induction mechanism works for all two-player complete-information games,
in which no player making a decision at a penultimate node (“last decision”,
leading directly to one of the endnodes of the game) can affect the sum of
payoffs for Players 1 and 2 (one well known example is the Trust Game).
Proposition 2 (Outcome-based preferences in sequential games) For
a two-player game, in which at any penultimate node the sum of obtainable
payoffs for Players 1 and 2 is constant, all perfect equilibria of the extended
game correspond to the perfect equilibria of the Stage 2 game.
In this class of games the last decision merely concerns distribution of the
surplus accrued between Players 1 and 2. Intuitively, because one cannot
be sure that the other player chose A, the best thing one can do is to grab
as many probability points for oneself as possible. And because such selfish
4This hypothesis can be weakened to players having risk preferences satisfying first
order stochastic dominance. Yet, for the sake of conciseness and clarity, we assume maxi-
mization of expected utility in the exposition.
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behavior is always expected, there is no reason to behave non-selfishly at
earlier nodes (see the On-line Supplement for the proof).
Proposition 2 does not imply that non-selfish equilibria will typically exist
in games in which the last player to choose can affect the dummy’s payoff.
Yet, the conditions for a separating equilibrium to exist are quite stringent
(see the On-line Supplement for the formal elaboration in the two-player
case).
It may be overly demanding though to assume that players adhere to the
equilibrium (especially in our experimental conditions with no repetition nor
feedback). Two alternative approaches can be considered. First, a conser-
vative approach based on no belief updating may be legitimate: given that
players cannot know for sure who chose what in Stage 1, they may reason it
does not matter who (among other players) gets the lottery tickets. In this
case, the same result as for simultaneous games hold. The second approach is
to have an agnostic view of the question, and observe subjects’ play to deter-
mine how relevant is the possibility of a separating equilibrium. There seems
to be very little overall difference in the behavior of A and B-players (see
the Result section below for details) suggesting that separation is unlikely
to occur. That is to say, given the empirical distribution of the population
of players, the optimal strategy for a pro-social player would be to play in
accordance with game-theoretic solutions.
It is worth noting that the plain binary-lottery payment scheme (Roth and
Malouf, 1979; Berg, Rietz, and Dickhaut, 2008) in which players’ payoffs are
in terms of probabilities to win a fixed prize (and zero otherwise), does not
guarantee that players have their preferences represented by the probability
payoffs of the game. In the absence of a player that gets the remaining
probabilities, there is an additional outcome of the game, namely that no
one gets the prize: (0)1≤k≤n. Social motives as ubiquitous as altruism or
efficiency (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Cox,
Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007; Levine, 1998) are then not controlled for. For
individuals motivated by these types of social concerns, having another player
winning may be preferred to the situation where no one wins. Cooperation
can be a rationalizable strategy in the Prisonner’s Dilemma for instance.
2.3.2 Preferences based on ex ante comparisons
Until recently, the vast majority of models of social preferences have fo-
cused on riskless situations. Over the last years evidence has been accumu-
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lated, however, that people seem not only to care about the monetary con-
sequences (ex post allocation) but also about the distribution of risk among
individuals (ex ante allocation) – see Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels 2005;
Krawczyk and Le Lec 2010; Brock, Lange, and Ozbay 2013 and the models
by Trautmann 2009 and Krawczyk 2011 for instance. One approach involves
assuming that social preference is defined in terms of expected, rather than
final payoffs within a game. Such preference does not lead to deviations
from “selfish” behavior in Stage 2 of our method, at least forA-players. The
intuition is that such social motives push subjects in the same direction as
self-interest, that is towards more chances to have A implemented. That is
because in any case, A-players are already “behind” in expected terms so
that motives such as inequity aversion or maximin would favour the player’s
self-interest. The same is true for efficiency or altruism: The most efficient
or altruistic allocation is A, so increasing the probability of seeing it imple-
mented increase efficiency or altruism in terms of expected payoff. Formally,
one can show the following (see On-line Supplement):
Proposition 3 If an A-player has maximin, altruistic, efficiency driven or
inequality-averse social preferences in terms of expected payoffs, then her
preferences are monotonic with her probability payoff.
In sum, for A-players, the usual prosocial motives push in the same direction
as self-interest, that is to increase the player’s probability payoff.
This control for ex ante preferences can only be achieved because individ-
uals go through Stage 1. Indeed, with the standard binary-lottery payment
scheme (possibly with an additional dummy player), some ex ante prosocial
player would be willing to share chances to win the prize. Given the accumu-
lating evidence of ex ante social concerns (Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels,
2005; Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010), the use of the standard binary-lottery
incentive scheme would rather tend to confirm the existence of such a dimen-
sion of social concern rather than control for social preferences in a broader
sense.
2.3.3 Interdependent preferences and reciprocity
One important class of models of social preferences are based on the idea of
reciprocity. Reciprocal preferences (as in Rabin 1993; Levine 1998; Charness
and Rabin 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher
2006; Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj 2008 among others) postulate individuals
prefer to reward benevolent interaction partners (or reversely punish malevo-
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lent ones), even at a cost.5 The validity of our methodology for reciprocal and
interdependent preferences is less clear. This is due to the relative complexity
of our method, which is magnified by the complexity of the reciprocity mod-
els themselves.6 Despite that, we nurture the view that our method should
at least partly mitigate the effect of reciprocity-based or interdependent pref-
erences, at least for A-players.
This is so for two main reasons: on the one hand, players face a clear
identification issue regarding the benevolence/malevolence of others in our
setting; and on the other hand, A-players have little available actions to re-
ward or punish some other subjects. Regarding the first point indeed, in
the absence of information about Stage 2 choices, players can hardly identify
overall benevolence/malevolence of their counterparts: acting in a prosocial
way in the stage game but having chosen the B allocation in Stage 1 can
hardly be interpreted as benevolent while maximizing one’s probability pay-
offs after having chosen A in the initial allocation task may be. The second
point is that even if players could overcome the first difficulty, A-players do
not have much room for rewarding or punishing the other. Suppose, for the
sake of the argument, that player i, who chose A in Stage 1, tends to believe
that j is benevolent. By positive reciprocity, the best that player i can do to
be kind to j is to increase the probability of seeing A implemented: increas-
ing her own payoff is as kind as increasing j’s probability payoff. Given the
uncertainty about the other’s type as well as the dummy player’s type, the
room for positive reciprocation seems small. In the opposite case, where i
believes that player j chose Bj, and hence is malevolent: player i can either
increase the probability of seeing A implemented (which is not a strong retal-
iation, but that is at least better than seeing Bj implemented) or can try to
have some other Bk implemented, that is having another B-player winning.
Yet, this last option would be both quite costly and would mean ‘rewarding’
k who has also chosen B. In sum, A-players do not have much opportunity
to punish or reward others but they do have the opportunity to increase the
probability to see A (their own choice) implemented.
5We consider here that interdependent preferences and reciprocal preferences as equiv-
alent even though there is a clear theoretical distinction between both: reciprocal prefer-
ences depend on the benevolence/malevolence of the action taken by some other player,
whereas for interdependent preferences, benevolence/malevolence depends on the other
player’s preferences. In our setting, there is little possibility to distinguish between both.
6Indeed, the latter often involve beliefs and second order beliefs, are not always clearly
defined for more than two players, are not aimed to deal with probabilistic outcomes, and
last but not least there does not seem yet to exist a scientific consensus on how to model
various features of reciprocal preferences.
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We hence expect our method to reduce interdependent and reciprocity con-
cerns. This feature would not necessarily be obtained in an alternative exper-
imental method to study the effect of social preferences in games that would
consist of eliciting (distributive) social preferences in a separate task and
compare it to observed individual behaviors in standard games (see Blanco,
Engelmann, and Normann (2011) for both an implementation of this idea
and the related issues).
3 Design
In order to test the validity of the method we had subjects play a number of
games, often studied experimentally before, under one of two treatments: in
the sessions with Selfishness Induction Treatment (SIT), the mechanism was
implemented, with group size n+1 = 5, to allow 2-player and 4 player games,
whereas the same games where played directly for money in the Control
Treatment (CT).
The experiment was preceded by a hypothetical pilot concerning Stage 1
only, aimed at calibrating the allocations so that the fair option would be
chosen by majority but not all subjects. The fair option always involved 40
PLN (approx. 10 euro) for each participant and unfair allocation paid 0 for
others. The payoff for the chooser in the unfair allocation was manipulated
between subjects, who were asked to report what they would choose and
what fraction of experiment participants they thought would choose each
option. It appeared that a payoff of approx. 60 PLN would give the desired
low but non-negligible fraction of individuals choosing the selfish option. It
was also clear that most individuals were rather pessimistic about other’s
choice: the predicted fraction of individuals choosing the selfish option was
substantially higher than the actual one. That tends to raise the incentives
in the SIT for the A-players: the perceived risk of ending up with nothing is
higher. Allocation B was set at 55 PLN, after the first session where it was
70.7
7After the first experimental session in which the selfish chooser’s payoff was set at 70
PLN, it was found that the proportion of subjects choosing the selfish option B was 60%,
much higher than in the pilot, which may have been due to the hypothetical nature of the
choice in the latter, or perhaps because the show-up fee of 5 PLN was not mentioned in
the pilot, making the selfish choice look even more harming to others. Either way, because
the selfishness induction mechanism was expected to work primarily for the individuals
choosing the fair allocation in Stage 1, the selfish chooser’s payment was reduced from 70
PLN to 55 PLN in subsequent sessions. Additionally, instructions were modified slightly,
clearly stating the second stage would consist of games of decision and payoffs would not
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The second stage consisted of eight rounds. The groups of five were re-
matched for each round. Subjects were told that one round would be chosen
at random at the end of the experiment to determine the distribution of
tokens (and thus chances for each participant’s choice from Stage 1 to be
implemented). The payoffs in tokens were calibrated in such a way that, first,
based on previous research, we could expect a substantial level of seemingly
non-selfish choices and, second, that the sum for the active players would
never exceed 100.
One fifth of our subjects constantly played the role of an inactive dummy
player (a residual claimant of tokens). These participants were asked to make
analogous, yet hypothetical decisions. The active participants were actually
divided into two-person subgroups during the first seven rounds. The first
round involved the Dictator Game with 40 tokens to share (such that the
“fifth”–the inactive dummy player–would always get 100-40-40=20 tokens).
Next, subjects played an Ultimatum Game with 50 tokens to be allocated,
using Minimal Acceptable Offer strategy method (Selten, 1967). The third
round was a Trust Game with an initial endowment of 15 tokens. The first
mover was asked to place 0, 3, 6 . . . or 15 tokens in the “second account”
which were subsequently tripled and divided by the second mover, whereas
tokens placed in the “first account” would be kept by the first mover. The
game was played using the strategy method. Rounds 4 to 6 were analogous
to rounds 1 to 3; we had half the active (non-dummy) subjects act as first
movers in rounds 1-3 and second movers in rounds 4-6. The other half faced
the reversed order. Round 7 was the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with payoffs
of 25 for both players in the case of mutual cooperation, 15 for each in
the case of mutual defection and the “temptation” and “sucker’s” payoffs
of 30 and 10 respectively. In rounds 1 to 7, no feedback was given. The
final round involved a linear four-person public goods game with six periods,
endowment of 2 tokens per round and marginal per capita return of .5. It
was the only round in which subjects were allowed to use decimals in their
choices. As is customary in these kinds of games, participants were given
immediate feedback after each period concerning the total contribution in
their group only. We chose the so-called partner-matching repeated PGG
given its prevalence in the literature on cooperation dilemmas (Andreoni,
1988; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000).
depend on skill or effort. These changes were found to indeed make a difference in the
first stage, but not in the second one. All the statistical tests reported below include the
first session but their results hold when discarding it, unless explicitly said otherwise.
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Throughout the experiment, participants could consult the printed general
instructions which explained how choices in Stage 2 affected the chances
of one’s allocation to be implemented. Instructions for specific rounds in
Stage 2 were displayed on the screen at the beginning of the relevant round.
Instructions were supplemented with examples and control questions that
subjects had to answer correctly in order to proceed. After the final round
subjects were asked to report some demographic variables. The computer
randomly selected one round and, given subjects’ probability payoffs from
that round of Stage 2 and their Stage 1 decisions, final monetary outcomes.
These were paid out in cash, immediately after the experiment.
The CT was analogous, except that there was no Stage 1 and subjects were
told that each token they earned in the selected round would be worth 2 PLN.
Considering typical results described in the literature we expected the average
earnings to be around 35-40 PLN, to equate in expected value earnings in
SIT, assuming most people would go for the equitable distribution in Stage
1. There was obviously no need to use dummy players in this treatment.
Our design and the corresponding theoretical predictions are summarized
in Table 5. The undetermined cases correspond to reciprocity preferences
taken in a broad sense: a reasonable assumption though would be that the
observed departure from the selfishness-based prediction should be smaller
in SIT than in the control treatment. By comparing these predictions (when
available) with the experimental data, it is hence possible to test how impor-
tant the various types of social preferences are in explaining usually observed
departures from the theory.
Participants were recruited from the subject pool of the Laboratory of
Experimental Economics at the University of Warsaw using ORSEE (Greiner,
2004). Among the 134 participants about half were male. All but 9 were
students, of which about half were Economics majors. Average age was
23.6. The experiment was conducted in the lab preventing communication
between subjects and was computerized using LabSEE XP Software.8 Six
sessions were run in total: three CT sessions and three SIT sessions with 20 to
25 subjects per session. The experiment lasted between 70 and 90 minutes,
typically a bit longer under SIT than CT. Average earnings including the
show-up fee were 36.7 PLN in the CT and 36.9 PLN in the SIT. An alternative
simple student job would pay 10-15 PLN per hour.
8Developed by Robert Borowski, see http://www.labsee.com.
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Games Description Outcome-based and Reciprocal and
Ex ante (A-types) interdep. pref.
x1 ∈ [0, 40] x1 = 0 x1 = 0
DG pi1(x1) = 40− x1
pi2(x1) = x1
x1 ∈ [0, 50] either x1 = 49 or x1 = 50 undetermined
x2 ∈ {a, r} and x2 = a
UG pi1(x1, a) = x1 (no signal.)
pi1(x1, r) = 0 or
pi2(x1, a) = 50− x1 separating
pi2(x1, r) = 0 eq.
x1 ∈ [0, 15] x1 = 0 x1 = 0
TG x2 ∈ [0, 3× x1] x2 = 0
pi1(x1, x2) = 15− x1 + x2
pi2(x1, x2) = 3× x1 − x2
x1, x2 ∈ {c, d} x1 = d x1 = d
pi1(c, c) = pi2(c, c) = 25 x2 = d x2 = d
PD pi1(c, d) = pi2(d, c) = 10
pi1(d, c) = pi2(c, d) = 30
pi1(d, d) = pi2(d, d) = 15
x ∈ [0, 2]4 either xi = 0 undetermined
PGG pii(x) = 2− xi + 1.54
∑
j xj (no signal.)
(repeated) or
separating
eq.
Table 5: Experimental games and predictions in SIT
4 Results
4.1 Control treatment and Stage 1 allocation choices
To assess the impact of our proposed experimental manipulation, it is
helpful to establish that our subjects’ behavior in the control treatment did
not deviate from typical findings in the literature. On top of that, since our
selfishness induction mechanism is expected to make a difference primarily
for subjects that are non-selfish in the first place, choices in Stage 1 will be
summarized too.
The first precondition seems to hold: in most games, our results replicate
typical findings in the experimental literature. In the DG, decision makers
gave away 34% of the pie, the equal split and complete selfishness being
frequent choices. The offers were somewhat higher in the UG (42% of the
available sum), with a mode at the equal split (40% of offers); the average
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minimal acceptable offer was 26% of the pie, with a median of 30%. In the
TG, subjects passed 52% of the available sum and second movers on average
would send back 20% of the available money, this percentage increasing with
the money passed by the first player from 13 % for 3 tokens sent to 32 %
for 15. In the PD, subjects cooperate 42% of the time; in the PGG, subjects
start contributing exactly half of the endowment on average and cooperation
goes down over time. Overall, our subjects seem to follow the general trends
observed in previous studies on these games – see e.g. Camerer (2003) for
a survey – perhaps with a very slight skew towards prosociality, which is
fortunate from our perspective, as it makes the theoretical difference between
SIT and CT more salient.
Regarding Stage 1 choices in SIT, we observe that, except for the first ses-
sion, the fraction of subjects choosing the equal allocation was, as expected,
quite high: 63% of subjects in the SIT treatment chose the A allocation.
This is fortunate as it provides numerous valid observations but also because
the proportion of B-choosers is far from negligible (a little more than one
third): the probability to face a selfish player increasing the incentives to
behave “selfishly” in the extended games.9
To study the results, we present two types of analyses: first, we run stan-
dard non-parametric tests of the treatment effect. Then, we run an OLS
regression with the strategy chosen in given game as the dependent variable
and dummy variables for the treatment, the order of choice tasks and various
socio-demographic features (gender, income10, a dummy for Economics ma-
jor) as independent variables.11 In order to have clear comparisons between
the games, we use exactly the same explanatory variables in all cases: we
keep all the variables that seem to play a significant role in at least one game.
We also conduct a logit analysis on the occurrence of selfish play (defined as
9As mentioned before, in a non-incentivized pilot session subjects were asked about
their beliefs regarding others’ choices in such an allocation task, and the percentage given
of B-choosers was greater than the actual percentage, suggesting that subjects would
rather overestimate others’ selfishness than underestimate it. Note also that for session 1,
the proportion was 60 % of B-players when b = 70 to be compared with a proportion of
25 % for other sessions, when b = 55.
10Note that income is a categorical variable coded as several dummies, since in the
post-experimental questionnaire only general ranges were offered to subjects in order to
take into account the general reluctance to state personal income in European countries.
We also ran analyses of variance with the same variables to take this into account, and
obtained similar results.
11The only exception is the PD, where response variable is binary, for which we used a
logit model with the same independent variables.
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being less than 10% away from the game-theoretical prediction, these 10%
being scaled on the length of the strategy set). Based on these statistics, we
observe a general tendency to be more selfish in SIT than in CT.
4.2 Games with treatment effects
In the Dictator Game, our mechanism induced more selfish behavior:
the subjects give on average 11.27 tokens (28.17% of the total of 40 tokens),
which is 1.97 tokens less than in the control treatment (W=2125, p=.04 in
a one-sided Mann-Whitney test). The proportion of 0 offers in the SIT was
27%, compared with 15% in the control treatment, whereas the equal split
was chosen by 25% and 34% respectively. These results are displayed in Fig.
1. It suggests that the main difference is the shift away from the (almost)
Figure 1: Distribution of offers in the DG
equal split and towards more complete selfishness: the former is modal in
CT, while the latter is in SIT. If we classify subjects as selfish when they
gave less than 10% of the available amount, a χ2 test of treatment effect
turns out weakly significant (2.9, p=.087). A linear regression confirms these
17
findings, and its results are summarized in table 6: Even when controlling
for the possibility of a slightly different composition of subject samples in
both treatments, the treatment effect is (weakly) significant and substantial.
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A similar treatment effect is visible in the behavior of first movers in the
Trust Game, with 6.16 tokens out of 15 being sent on average in the SIT and
7.82 in the CT, a difference of 21%. Again, the distributions are significantly
different according to a Mann-Whitney test (W=2138, p=.03). The results
are displayed in Fig. 2. Once again, an analysis of the occurrence of ratio-
Figure 2: Distribution of tokens sent in the TG
nal choice (in the sense of backward induction under common knowledge of
selfishness) in both treatments using a χ2 test reveals a weakly significant dif-
ference (3.17, p=.075) between the two treatments. Also, an OLS regression
controlling for various socio-demographic and experimental variables leads
to a milder conclusion, with treatment being only on the verge of weak sig-
nificance (with p = .12 for the estimated coefficient of Induction, see table
6).
In contrast, no difference is observed regarding the behavior of second
players. The proportion of money sent back is displayed in Fig. 3. No
statistical difference can be found between the two treatments, for any specific
20
amount of money sent or for an aggregate measure of planned repayment.
Analyses of variance on the money sent back for 3, 6, 9, 12 and 15 tokens
show that the Economics major and occasionally the order of tasks play a
significant role in the money sent back, but SIT is never associated with a
p-value less than .30. χ2 tests of frequency of purely selfish behavior do not
Figure 3: Proportion of tokens sent back in the TG
reveal any significant difference for the amount that was sent either.
In the Public Goods Game, we also observe a difference between the two
treatments: the average contribution is 1 token (out of an endowment of 2)
in the first round under CT, whereas it only reaches .70 token (35%) in SIT
(see Fig. 4). The distributions of individual contributions are significantly
different (one-sided Mann-Whitney, W=1379, p=.01). All further rounds are
also significantly different except for the last one. To study the data in all
the rounds with full statistical independence, we chose groups as appropriate
level of analysis.12 Focusing on the sum of contributions per group for each
12Indeed, individual behavior in the second and subsequent rounds depends critically
on other members in the group in the first round, in particular because of reputation or
21
round, we find that the first 4 rounds yield significant results (one-sided
Mann Whitney, with p < .05 except in the case of the third round for which
p < .10). Considering the total contribution within a group across the 6
rounds, SIT and CT differ significantly (.46 token on average per subject
and round for SIT versus .82 for CT, p = .046 in a one-sided Mann-Whitney
test). Once again, at the individual level, we also find that the proportion of
Figure 4: Average contribution in the PGG by round
almost purely selfish behaviors is different for both treatments: for the first
round (the only one for which statistical independence holds), a χ2 test yields
a value of 3.52 (p=.06). This effect of treatment on voluntary contributions
is confirmed by a linear regression with the usual control variables (Table
6).13
reciprocity.
13Note that the overall quality of the model is very low, but other specifications, while
improving the model, yield similar estimated coefficients and significance levels for the
effect of treatment. For reasons of homogeneity, we keep the same specification across the
games.
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Overall, in these three games, we observe substantial differences between
the control treatment and the selfishness induction treatment and these dif-
ferences go in the direction that was assumed, i.e. towards more selfishness.
In particular more individuals seem to behave (almost) in line with game-
theoretic prediction. Yet, it is quite striking that even if some effect of SIT is
observable, subjects are still far from playing as predicted (that is playing as
if selfish in the stage game). In the Dictator Game, whose payoff structure
is quite easy to grasp, most subjects give something (two thirds give more
than 5 tokens out of 40). In the Trust Game, not only first players send
money but are repaid by the second player, even though the subgame perfect
equilibrium is quite simple to identify. Finally, in the PGG, although we
observe some difference, the across rounds contribution is still far from 0 and
does not clearly tend to 0 with time. For the last round, in particular, the
average contribution is almost the same for both CT and SIT.
In addition to this remaining gap between behavior and prediction in these
three games, it is noteworthy that in the two other games tested, no differ-
ence at all seems to exist between those two treatments, as explored in the
following subsection.
4.3 Games with no treatment effect
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the proportion of subjects who chose to
cooperate reached 45% under SIT vs. 42% in CT, a non-significant difference
(χ2 = .0074, p=.93). A logit model (Table 6) leads to the same conclusion.
Interestingly, the PD is the game where the SIT mechanism should provide
the cleanest control over social preferences: no signaling is possible and the
theoretical prediction corresponds to the simplest game-theoretic notion, that
is the strict dominance of a strategy.
In the Ultimatum Game subjects offered a bit less on average in the
SIT, namely 19.91 against 21.02 under CT out of 50 tokens available, but
the difference in distributions does not reach any conventional significance
level (Mann-Whitney’s W=1953.5, p=.19). This is illustrated by Fig. 5.
Responder behavior does not seem affected by treatment either: the Mini-
mal Acceptable Offer is slightly higher in SIT than in CT (14.14 vs 13.06)
and the difference is not significant (two-sided Mann-Whitney’s W=1720.5,
p=.71). The results are displayed in Fig. 6. For both first and second player’s
behavior, an OLS regression (Table 6) does not yield significant results re-
garding treatment, even though the order of play had a significant impact
23
Figure 5: Distribution of offers in the UG
for both players, and studying economics on the second player’s behavior.14
4.4 An overall effect
The induction procedure generates a shift towards subjects’ more selfish
choices in at least three different games and the opposite effect is never
observed. To assess the overall impact, we computed a composite index of
‘selfishness’, or more specifically a measure of how distant subjects’ choices
are from the game theoretical solutions (Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect
equilibrium for sequential games). To do so, we constructed a standardized
index of relative compliance with the theoretical prediction, ranging from 0
(for largest observed deviations across treatments from the selfish equilibrium
in a given game) to 1 (for equilibrium plays).15 We then averaged the index
14The frequency of the subgame perfect equilibrium play cannot even be compared
across treatments, since no player chose less than five tokens in the CT and only two did
so in the SIT. A looser definition of “almost selfish play” does not yield any significant
result in a logit analysis.
15An alternative would be to assign the value of 0 to the largest deviation in the strategy
space (even if it was never actually played), but we think it would reduce comparability
across games: for instance contributing 100% of one’s endowment in the PGG appears to
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Figure 6: Distribution of minimal acceptable offers in the UG
over all decisions made by each individual player in the various games, and
various roles in the game, such that each game played had identical weight
(two roles in the same game being considered as two games). When the
strategy method was used (e.g. TG) or when several decisions were made
(e.g PGG) then the average index for all possible cases was taken as the index
for the particular game. The distribution of the (subject-specific) values of
the index is shown in Fig. 7.
A linear regression of this index with the same explanatory variables as
for individual games gives the results displayed in Table 6. These results
suggest indeed that our selfishness induction design had an overall effect on
subjects, and that in this treatment they tended to play more in line with
game theoretical solutions with selfishness assumed. This effect though was
quite moderate, especially if contrasted with predictions for most games.
be less of a deviation from the prediction than keeping 0 in the UG.
25
Figure 7: Distribution of the selfishness index
5 Discussion
On a general note, using our selfishness induction method does bring sub-
jects closer to the prediction. Therefore, social preferences covered by our
mechanism are likely to explain part of the departure from theoretically ex-
pected play. Still for a large share, the deviation cannot be accounted for
by this type of preferences. First, the treatment effect varies between games
and roles. Second, even for the games where the SIT mechanism seems to
make a difference, a large share of subjects still depart from the theoretical
prediction. In the PGG, where the effect is strong, in the first round 32 out
of 56 SIT subjects contribute more than 10% of their endowment, and aver-
age contribution approximately equals one third of the endowment. In the
TG, first movers pass on average nearly 40% of the endowment, and three
quarters demonstrate some trust by passing a positive amount. The picture
is even more striking in the DG, where subjects give on average 28% of the
total sum, and only 30% of subjects give less than 10% of the total sum, with
more than a fifth choosing the equal split. Overall, regarding the selfishness
index, the average index is .65 for the SIT to be compared with .60 in the
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CT.
Three types of explanations can be put forth: First of all, the relative
weakness of the difference in the Control and Induction treatments could
be driven by some experimental artifact: the SIT may have side-effects or
work only on a specific subsample of subjects. Alternatively, it could be
that the types of social preferences theoretically covered by the SIT method
do not explain a significant part of the usual departures from predictions in
experimental conditions. This could be because subjects’ social preferences
are of a type that does not belong to the class covered by the method; or,
more radically, subjects might depart from the predictions for reasons other
than their social preferences. We discuss these three views in the following
subsections.
5.1 Side effects, behavior by types and signaling
One disadvantage of the method is that in increases complexity of the situ-
ation. This might affect subjects’ behavior: the overall situation being more
complicated, individuals may be more prone to errors, which could result
in increased variance. This effect could drive deviations from predictions,
particularly in the cases in which the latter are at one end of the strategy
space: larger or more frequent errors would result in an apparent departure
from the theoretical benchmark. We do not have much evidence for such
an increase in frequency of ‘unreasonable’ play: 7% of subjects passed more
than half the tokens in the dictator for SIT, to be compared with 4% for
CT (χ2 = 0.03, p = .85), in the UG the figures are 9 and 10% (χ2 = 0.03,
p = .94). For the TG, only 12% versus 6% sent back more than half the
tokens in the case of an initial sending of 15 tokens by player 1 (χ2 = 0.75,
p = .39). Overall, this gives little support to the idea that errors are larger
(and more prevalent) in the case of SIT.
A possibly more promising explanation is that the aggregate picture hides
major differences between B-players and A-players, with the former being
the ones departing strongly from the theoretical predictions in the SIT (as
is theoretically possible). One straightforward reason is “ex ante social pref-
erences” understood as social preference applying to expected (monetary)
payoffs (Trautmann, 2009; Krawczyk, 2011): someone who prefers B to A
in the first stage may still exhibit some social concerns in expected payoffs.
After having selected B and realized she is ahead of others in Stage 2, she
may feel bad about having too high a chance of leaving others with nothing
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(because of efficiency, altruism or inequity aversion). This would mean that
only B-types do depart from selfish play in the Stage 2 games.
One way to check for that is to see whether the difference between both
treatments is mostly explained by A-players rather than Bs. We can also
check whether the divergence from game-theoretic predictions in Stage 2 is
due to behavior of B-players. That is not what we observe: contrary to
this explanation, B-players are, if anything, more ‘selfish’ on average in the
second part of the experiment. For instance in the DG they give on average
10.18 tokens to be compared with 11.97, W=424, p=.18, and similar results
are obtained for all games. Overall, the selfishness index of the B-players is
higher than their A counterparts (.71 versus .60, p < .001 for both Student’s
t test and Mann-Whitney). These observations lead us to believe that the
gap between game-theoretic predictions and observed behavior is not mostly
driven by B-subjects.
Another promising explanation for this remaining discrepancy between ac-
tual play and the theoretical prediction can be that subjects use their position
as first player to signal their type in the first stage of the experiment. Again,
this would be an artifact of the method – an additional trigger of cooperative
behavior that is absent in the standard, control game. Signaling could also
be taking place in early rounds of the PGG. Because, as we have shown be-
fore, A types care relatively more about others’ types, if such signaling was
a significant factor, we would expect A types to exhibit strong conditional
cooperation. In fact, panel regression analyzes do not suggest any difference
between A’s and B’s propensity to reciprocate cooperation.
In the UG, the fact that subjects depart from the subgame-perfect equilib-
rium in the SIT as much as in the control treatment could possibly correspond
to a separating equilibrium (that is, A-players signaling in a costly way their
types). Intuitively, playing selfishly in the UG could lead the opponent to
think that the first player is not a ‘nice guy’ and likely has chosen alloca-
tion B. If such belief updating is sufficiently strong, rejection could actually
increase responder’s expected payoff. Empirically, though, we observe very
little evidence, if any, of such a phenomenon. A-players on average pass 18.77
tokens while B-players 20.65 (p = .39 for Student’s t test), and the minimum
acceptable offer averages 14.54 tokens for B-players versus 13.88 for A-players
(p = .79 for Student’s t test). The behaviors of the two types are virtually
indistinguishable in the data, giving little support to an explanation in terms
of signaling.
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For the TG, the subgame perfect equilibrium is also clear (see Proposition
2) but it could be that signaling for A-players is in effect not a too costly
strategy: for instance, if B-players send nothing in almost all the cases, and
almost all A-players send some positive amount, then the second players
would be able to distinguish both types and A-players could send back a
lot in the case of a large initial contribution at almost no cost and not to
do so when facing B-players. Overall, we do observe that A-players depart
from equilibrium more than B’s, so that some signaling may occur. Yet,
based on empirical distributions of play and types in the TG, signaling for
A-players is never an empirically optimal strategy: the probability to see A
implemented is greatest when the first mover, of type A, sends nothing; it
then decreases slowly with the tokens sent(from a probability of .69 when
sending nothing to a .63 when sending 15 tokens). Moreover, for signaling
to be an efficient strategy for A-players, the second players should be able to
identify the types of first player based on their actions. Based on empirical
distributions of actions and types, this turns out to be quite difficult: the
proportion of Bs varies for non-zero amounts sent from 55.6 % to 85.7%,
in a non-monotonic way. In particular, sending 9 tokens is associated with
highest proportion of B-types, while 12 tokens–the lowest. The proportion
of B-players among those first players who sent something is 28.6%, to be
compared with 39.3% for the whole population of first players. So, there
may be some attempt at signaling but most first player strategies are also
followed by a significant share of Bs, rendering the identification of player 1’s
type very uncertain for the second player.
In sum, we find little evidence of a separating equilibrium for games where
signaling could be a rational strategy (repeated PGG) and some evidence
in the TG, where it is unexpected. To a certain extent, it could explain
variations between games: in the UG, if the first player’s move is taken as
a signal of her type, then the second player would conclude that the cost of
rejecting a small offer is quite low (in particular in comparison with the CT)
because the dummy player is relatively more likely to be of type A than the
first player. Rejecting low offers may hence represent some acceptable risk.
5.2 Alternative types of social preferences
An obvious candidate for a class of social preferences not fully covered by
the method that could explain the remaining gap between behaviors and pre-
dictions is reciprocity. In section 2, we only suggested that our method would
reduce, and not necessarily remove, reciprocal concerns. It is tempting to in-
terpret the partial effect of our method as compatible with reciprocity-based
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preferences. Although theoretically possible, the details of the results suggest
that if relevant, reciprocity-driven behavior is only part of the explanation.
Indeed, several specific features fit only weakly with such an explanation. In
the DG for instance, where no reciprocity-driven actions can be expected,
choices in SIT are still quite far from the theoretical prediction. In games
where the role of reciprocity is expected to be strong (PD,UG,TG,PGG), we
find mixed results: quite a strong effect of selfishness induction mechanism
in the PGG and for the first player of the TG, and no effect for the PD, the
UG and the second player of the TG.
More critically perhaps, to account for our results in SIT, reciprocity would
fundamentally need to apply not to final consequences (even in expected
terms) but to probability payoff. For instance, interpreting the observed
payback by A-types of Player 2 of the TG in terms of positive reciprocity
requires that even if the expected payoff of the first player will stay the same
increasing her probability payoff is more benevolent than not doing so. One
possible interpretation is that some symbolic reciprocity comes into play: the
second player accepts to bear a cost (in expected terms given that he is not
sure of player 1’s type) just to send an ‘acknowledgment’ message, which will
have no material consequence to A-type of Player 1. More generally, this
would mean that reciprocity, and by extension social preferences, go deeper
than usually assumed by models because the signals are what matters rather
than the ultimate consequences.
Pushing this interpretation to its extreme, our results could mean that
what matters for social preferences are not mainly the consequences of a
chosen actions but the actions themselves. In a way, the classical debate
between consequentialism and deontologism in ethics echoes this issue: what
may matter, for an action to be good, is for a large part its proximity with
a normative benchmark, or its conformity with a normative rule.16 In this
sense the consequences are secondary, but prosociality would imply to adopt
an action not too far from a moral standard: sharing (or splitting equally) in
the DG, doing one’s share in cooperation, trusting others, etc. How proso-
cial an action is may not primarily be measured in terms of the final conse-
quences but within the structure of the game. In other words, the structure
16In philosophy, one of the most prominent advocate of a deontological approach to
ethics is Kant. In his view, lying for instance is never a moral action, regardless of the
consequences. In his famous example, lying is still immoral, even though telling the truth
results in the death of an innocent. Empirically, several studies have put forth some
aversion to lying (Gneezy, 2005; Erat and Gneezy, 2012) or cheating, that cannot be
explained by consequentialist motives.
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of the interaction may matter more than the consequences. This would quite
straightforwardly explain that behaviors are only mildly different in SIT than
in CT.
In a similar spirit, social norms (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr,
and Gintis, 2004) may provide an explanation for our results. In general,
a social norm entails a specific type of behavior; following the norm one
may not choose the action optimal from the point of view of some social
principle (such as efficiency or equity). If norms are just broad principles to
be followed, such as “share equally”, limited behavioral difference between
the case of playing for probabilities to see one’s preferred allocation and
playing directly for monetary units is to be expected. In this view, certain
situations call for certain conduct. In support of this interpretation, there is
some evidence (Gneezy and Guth, 2003) that the equal split in bargaining
situations applies even to asymmetric interactions, where equity would be
best approached by unequal split of the available resources.
5.3 Alternatives to social preferences
An alternative explanation may stem from the fact that subjects do not
conceive of strategic interactions the way game theory assumes rational play-
ers do. One possible deviation is that subjects reason collectively, as if all
players were a team (Sugden, 1993). It may also well be that they use
heuristics or other cognitive short-cuts (Simon, 1982; Selten, 1998). Indi-
viduals may fail to reason consequentially when the outcome is uncertain:
Shafir and Tversky (1992) provide some evidence that it may be the case
for the Prisoner’s dilemma. In the absence of opportunities to learn in our
experiment, the observed behavior may reveal that individuals tend to ap-
proach cognitively strategic interactions in a different way from the strategic
rationality postulated by game theory.
It cannot be entirely excluded either that some players deemed it fair to
give everyone some chance to co-decide about final allocation. However, vo-
luminous research in social psychology tends to show that already purely
symbolic (non-instrumental) “voice” given to parties involved in an interac-
tion tends to satisfy the need for a fair procedure (Lind and Tyler, 1988). It
would thus seem that once all players submitted their preferred allocation in
Stage 1, it may not be necessary that each has a positive number of tokens.
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6 Conclusion
Our results suggest that although part of the gap between theoretical predic-
tions and usual experimental game results is driven by social preferences, an
important share of this deviation remains to be explained, a point already
put forth by Andreoni (1995) and Andreoni and Blanchard (2006). As a
consequence, it raises the question of why subjects still depart from the the-
oretical solutions, an issue perhaps even more crucial than the explanatory
power of social preferences: it may shed light on why, in usual experimental
settings, subjects do not always play according to predictions.
Our results seem to indicate that only part of the discrepancy between
typically observed behavior in games and standard equilibrium predictions
may be “blamed” on social preferences. They suggest that dropping the
assumption of selfishness alone, especially by allowing outcome-based prefer-
ence only, will not help us dramatically improve predictions for experimental
games. They also suggest, in line with other research, that other forms of
social preferences, or alternative explanations, may form a promising avenue
for future research.
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